On May 6, 2026, the Financial Stability Board issued its first formal report on vulnerabilities in private credit, a market that has grown to roughly $2 trillion in assets and quietly become the dominant source of financing for sponsor-backed deals. The report is not a crisis call. It is something more useful: a regulatory acknowledgment that the credit machine financing most middle-market transactions is now too large, too leveraged, and too interconnected with banks and insurers to be left unexamined. For business owners and dealmakers, the practical question is what to do with that signal before the next financing decision.
The FSB's report focuses on four specific vulnerabilities: deepening bank-to-private-credit interlinkages, opaque valuation and credit risk practices, concentration and leverage inside fund structures, and significant supervisory data gaps. Bank exposures to private credit funds capture roughly $220 billion in drawn and undrawn credit lines on the conservative end, with commercial estimates ranging up to $500 billion when indirect channels are counted. The report does not predict a default cycle. It does flag that private credit has grown rapidly and remains untested in a sustained downturn, and it asks national regulators to close data gaps, harmonize definitions, and develop a comparable set of surveillance metrics across jurisdictions.
The release matters because private credit has become the connective tissue of modern dealmaking. The majority of US private equity buyouts in the last three years have been financed by direct lenders rather than syndicated bank loans, and refinancings on assets bought during the 2020 to 2021 vintage are now arriving on schedule. The FSB report is the first cross-border framing of what dealmakers have been navigating quietly for several quarters.
The headline numbers tell a coherent story when paired with the underlying data. Approximately 40 percent of private credit borrowers now carry negative free cash flow, up from 25 percent in 2021, according to recent industry reporting. Fitch Ratings put the US private credit default rate at 5.8 percent for the trailing twelve months through January, the highest reading since the metric began. Lenders are not panicked, but they are more disciplined. They are doing deeper diligence on the same borrowers they would have approved quickly two years ago, and they are tightening covenants on new originations even as a portion of the existing book moved to covenant-lite during the cheap-money era.
For an owner considering a sale, this changes how buyers approach financing. A sponsor that needs to clear a leveraged loan commitment letter with a direct lender will price more conservatively today than in 2024, and that conservatism flows through to the bid. For an owner not selling but refinancing, the conversation with the lender will look different. Loans originated in 2020 and 2021 at low rates and loose covenants will not roll over on the same terms. Many will require a meaningful equity check, a tighter covenant package, or both.
Buyers, particularly financial sponsors, are now planning their bids with a sharper view on the financing stack. Three behaviors have become more visible.
First, sponsors are pre-committing more equity per deal. The leverage profile that supported a 7 times EBITDA bid two years ago may now require a half-turn less of debt, with the gap filled by additional sponsor equity. That can compress headline multiples for sellers even when sponsor interest is strong.
Second, sponsors are spending more time on the seller's working capital, cash conversion, and contract quality. When a buyer's own financing is conditional on a lender's underwriting, the buyer pushes diligence harder on items that would survive a tight credit environment. Sellers who can show clean cash conversion and contracted, recurring revenue are receiving better terms than those whose earnings depend on a small number of customers or one-time events.
Third, sponsors are using more contingent consideration, including earnouts and seller financing, to bridge valuation gaps that the credit market will no longer fund. The number of deals containing earnouts has been climbing, and recent studies show only a portion of the maximum earnout potential is actually paid. Sellers should treat earnout structures as real value at risk, not as a number on the cover of a term sheet.

The FSB report also calls out the indirect exposures that connect banks, insurers, and private credit funds. Many banks now serve as fund-finance providers to private credit, lending against the fund's commitments and assets rather than to the underlying companies. Other banks act as origination partners that warehouse loans before they move to a fund. Insurers have become the largest end-buyers of private credit risk, often through structured vehicles.
For a borrower, none of this is theoretical. It explains why a private credit fund may suddenly tighten its terms even when the fund itself appears well-capitalized, and why some funds have paused or slowed their pace. The same regulatory attention now applied to banks during the post-2008 cycle is starting to extend to the entities that buy fund-level risk. Borrowers should ask their lender plainly how the fund finances itself, who its end investors are, and whether the lender retains the flexibility to extend or modify terms if conditions change again.
The FSB report does not change the trajectory of any individual deal. It does change the backdrop against which lenders, sponsors, and boards are making decisions. A few trends are worth watching through the second half of 2026.
The first is the pace of GP-led secondaries and continuation vehicles. Sponsors that cannot exit at the valuation they need are increasingly rolling assets into new vehicles, and continuation fund activity grew roughly 70 percent year over year in 2025. That trend tells us where the gap sits between what sellers want and what the credit market can finance.
The second is the divergence between high-quality and mid-tier assets. B-plus to A assets continue to attract competitive bidding and tight credit terms. Mid-tier assets, those with concentrated customers, lumpy cash flow, or recent margin compression, face wider bid-ask spreads and more conservative financing packages. Owners in the middle band have the most to gain from operational work that moves a business into the higher tier before going to market.
The third is the slow but real rise of private ratings, syndication transparency, and standardized reporting inside the private credit world. Regulators are signaling that they want to see better data, and that pressure is starting to land inside the fund structures themselves. Borrowers will benefit from clearer documentation and tighter information rights over the next several quarters.
The FSB report is best understood as a benchmark, not a warning siren. Private credit has become a permanent feature of how middle-market deals get done, and the conditions inside that market have shifted in ways owners can plan around. Sellers should expect more diligence, tighter financing, and more contingent consideration. Borrowers should expect harder refinancing conversations and treat their next discussion with a lender as a strategic exercise rather than a procedural one. Buyers should prepare to put more equity to work per deal, and to be more selective about which assets justify the financing stack. The deals will get done, just on terms that reflect today's market.