The average middle-market M&A transaction closed at 9.8x EV/EBITDA in 2025, up from 9.4x in 2024 and 9.0x in 2023, according to Capstone Partners' most recent middle-market M&A report. In the same study, 27.4 percent of surveyed advisors expect multiples to rise further in 2026, while 66 percent expect little to no change. Both numbers matter. They describe a market that has recovered from the post-2022 compression, that is moving sideways at a higher level rather than re-accelerating, and that is rewarding specific kinds of assets with meaningful premia. For business owners planning a sale in the next two years, the Q1 signal is an anchor for realistic conversations about value.
It is easy to look at "9.8x" and conclude that pricing is uniform. It is not. Capstone's sector breakdown shows the Aerospace, Defense, Government and Security (ADGS) grouping, Business Services, Energy, and Technology, Media and Telecom (TMT) each posting year-over-year improvement in average purchase multiples during 2025. Specialty industrial, certain healthcare services, and software categories continued to clear at premium multiples well above the blended average. Meanwhile, segments exposed to consumer cyclicality, tariff-sensitive supply chains, or rising input costs traded at or below trend.
Two public-market comparisons help frame the private-market discipline. Damodaran's January 2026 Stern data set puts the public-market blended EV/EBITDA average at roughly 19.7x across all sectors. GF Data's PE-sponsored middle-market series is in the 7.2x range. Middle-market M&A multiples sit between the two because buyers price in the private-company discount (illiquidity, customer concentration, key-person risk) while giving credit for strategic fit and platform leverage. A 9.8x blended average is not a number to be compared to the S&P multiple. It is a deal-market benchmark that only becomes useful after the sector, size, and quality adjustments are applied.
The sector premia are where the real work sits. A specialty industrial business with recurring aftermarket revenue and a documented operating model can clear meaningfully above 9.8x in today's market. A similar-sized business without the recurring revenue story, or with concentration risk in its top three customers, will clear below. The blended multiple is the starting line, not the finish line.
Three dynamics explain the current posture. The first is capital abundance with selectivity. Private equity entered 2026 with significant dry powder, and strategic acquirers have rebuilt cash generation to pre-2022 levels. That capital is available but patient. Buyers are declining deals that would have cleared in 2021 because the business case no longer supports the price.
The second is the buyer's cost of capital. The federal funds target range has sat at 3.50 to 3.75 percent for two consecutive FOMC meetings, and forward pricing implies only one rate cut before year-end. Private credit coupons have compressed modestly from their 2024 peak but remain well above the pre-2022 baseline. A sponsor buyer modeling a 2029 exit is building a capital stack that needs the target company to generate real EBITDA growth, not just pay down debt at low rates. That discipline is being applied at the letter-of-intent stage, not at closing.
The third is the quality premium. Buyers are paying up for what Capstone's advisors describe as "durability and transferability." Plainly stated, they are paying more for businesses that do not depend on the founder's relationships, that have defensible margin, and that carry a clean set of financials. The gap between a well-prepared $25 million EBITDA seller and an unprepared one can now exceed two full turns of EBITDA on the multiple alone, before any price adjustments in diligence.

The most practical use of the Capstone data is as a reality check on expectations. Owners often arrive at a first advisory conversation with a target price anchored either to a 2021 comparable transaction or to the public-market multiple of a sector peer. Neither is a reliable input. The 2021 comparables reflected a capital environment that no longer exists; the public-market multiple reflects a company with scale, disclosure, and liquidity that a private company does not.
The 9.8x average, adjusted for sector and quality, produces a defensible opening range. A $20 million EBITDA business services company with a stable customer book and a documented operating model can be modeled at 9.5 to 11.5x today. The same business with 40 percent customer concentration and founder-dependent sales clears closer to 7.5 to 9.0x. The work between the two is operational readiness, not market timing.
A second practical use of the data is scenario building. An owner planning a sale 18 to 24 months out can use the current Capstone benchmarks to model three cases: multiples drift slightly higher (the 27.4 percent view), multiples hold flat (the 66 percent view), and multiples compress. The last case, which is not the consensus today but cannot be dismissed, allows the seller to decide in advance at what point they would choose to transact versus hold. Building that decision logic in advance is the single best insurance against selling too low in a soft quarter or missing a window in a firm one.
Three dynamics will shape whether the sideways-at-a-higher-level posture continues. The first is the path of the federal funds rate. If the projected single 2026 cut lands and a second follows early in 2027, financing costs for sponsor buyers ease, which can support a modest move up in multiples for premium assets. If rates hold, the disciplined posture continues.
The second is the credit cycle. Private credit defaults are widely forecast to rise in the back half of 2026. A meaningful increase in default rates does not automatically compress M&A multiples, but it does narrow the buyer pool by constraining the capital available to smaller sponsor funds and club deals. Owners watching the headlines in private credit should read them as an indirect signal about the buyer set they will face.
The third is sector rotation. Deal activity in the first quarter continued to concentrate in segments the market considers durable (ADGS, specialty industrial, specific software categories). That rotation has already begun pricing into multiples. Owners in those sectors benefit from the tailwind; owners outside them will need a stronger individual company story to clear the blended benchmark.
The Capstone 9.8x is the most useful starting data point for a middle-market valuation conversation in 2026. It is not the answer; it is the reference. The real work is calibrating sector, size, and quality adjustments against that anchor, stress-testing expectations across multiple outcomes, and investing in the operational and financial readiness that separates a 10.5x outcome from an 8.5x outcome on the same business. Owners who arrive at an advisory conversation with the benchmark in mind, the adjustments mapped, and the readiness plan in motion will negotiate from a stronger position than the market average implies.